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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the tactics employed by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles (NZMR) 
Brigade during the Sinai Palestine Campaign of World War I. It seeks to determine how 
the Boer War shaped mounted rifles tactical doctrine prior to World War I, what tactics 
were employed during the Sinai Palestine campaign itself, and how the tactics evolved 
over the course of the campaign. It begins by tracing the New Zealand experience in the 
Boer War, the ensuing development of mounted rifles tactical doctrine and the formation 
of yeomanry and mounted rifles units immediately prior to World War I. The thesis 
follows the campaign in Sinai and Palestine, focusing primarily on patrolling operations 
and attacks, from the re-building of the NZMR Brigade after its return to Egypt from 
Gallipoli in December 1915, until the conclusion of operations at Amman in September 
1918. 
The thesis finds that by 1914, New Zealand mounted rifles units trained to employ fire 
tactics, to move mounted, but to conduct attacks dismounted. New Zealanders 
undertook extensive mounted patrolling from the outset of the campaign. Most attacks 
were conducted as 'quick' attacks, despite Turkish defensive -positions often being well 
prepared and stubbornly defended. Most attacks employed envelopment of enemy 
flanks and followed a general pattern of firing lines of dismounted troopers closing on the 
enemy under the combined weight of their own and neighbouring rifle fire, machine gun 
fire and artillery support. Attacks usually concluded with a bayonet charge from short 
range, once firing lines had got close enough to the enemy. Mounted charges were 
rarely undertaken, despite the spectacular success of the Australian mounted charge at 
Beersheba. Indeed, the New Zealand commander, General Chaytor, made a deliberate 
decision to continue employing dismounted tactics. The thesis finds that longevity in 
command appointments and the influence and experience of Boer War veterans had a 
positive effect on the tactics used by the NZMR Brigade. 
Table of Contents 
Lists of Maps, Diagrams and Photographs ii 
Acknowledgments iii 
Introduction The New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade 1 
Chapter 1 The Boer War 4 
Chapter 2 Tactics and Doctrine Circa 1914 17 
Chapter 3 Background to the Sinai-Palestine Campaign 32 
Chapter 4 Operations in Egypt and Sinai 42 
Chapter 5 The Invasion of Palestine 74 
Chapter 6 The Jordan Valley and Beyond 101 
Chapter 7 Command, Leadership and Tactics 120 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 130 
Appendix 1 NZMR Brigade War Diary 137 
Appendix 2 NZMR Brigade Special Order No 24 of 9 July 138 
1917 
Appendix 3 NZMR Brigade Commanding Officers 139 
Appendix 4 Analysis of NZMR Tactics 141 
Primary Sources 143 
Secondary Sources 145 
Cover Photograph: NZMR riding through Es Salt, Powles, Sina, and Palestine, p. 248 
II 
Lists of Maps, Diagrams and Photographs 
Maps 
Map 1 
Map 2 
Map 3 
Map 4 
Map 5 
Map 6 
Map 7 
Map 8 
Map 9 
Map 10 
Map 11 
Map 12 
Diagrams 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
Figure 5 
Figure 6 
Figure 7 
Photographs 
Sinai Peninsular 
Romani 
Magdhaba 
Rafa 
Invasion of Palestine 
Gaza I and II 
Beersheba 
Ayun Kara 
Action at Jericho 
Palestine and southern Syria 
Night Attack at Amman 
Amman 25 September 1918 
Levels of War 
Frontal Attack and Envelopment 
Use of Ground 
Mounted Rifles Attack 
Structure of the NZMR Brigade 
Regimental Formations: Line and Column 
Squadron Formation (Line of Troop Columns) 
De Wet's commando crosses the Orange River 
Member of 5th New Zealand Contingent, Boer War 
Instruction on the Lewis Gun 
Typical NZMR Troop 
WMR horse lines 
NZMR firing line at Rafa 
Rafa 
Hotchkiss Gun and crew, WMR 
Somerset Battery RHA in action 
Turkish machine gunners Gaza II 
Turks in trenches near Gaza 
NZMR troops move through Bethlehem to the River Jordan 
Amman with Hill 3039 in the background 
CMR crosses the Jordan 
Dummy horses- Jordan Valley 
Major General Sir EWC Chaytor 
Corporal Williams and his horse rest in the sun- Palestine 
Brigadier General W Meldrum 
42 
48 
55 
61 
74 
77 
88 
92 
98 
102 
108 
116 
17 
20 
20 
25 
35 
56 
56 
68 
68 
69 
69 
69 
70 
70 
70 
70 
71 
71 
72 
72 
72 
72 
73 
73 
73 
111 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank the following for assisting me with this thesis: 
The staff at Archives New Zealand; Dolores Ho from the Kippenberger Military 
Archive and Research Library at the Army Museum, Waiouru; Vicki Hughes and 
Linda Evans of the Alexander Turnbull Library, Oral History Centre; Sean McMahon 
of the Alexander Turnbull Library, Manuscripts and Archives Section - all assisted me 
conduct my research, allowing me access to a wide range of primary sources. 
The New Zealand Defence Force Library staff, particularly Katrina Willoughby, Joan 
Keate and Mary Slatter, were all especially helpful in locating articles and obscure 
references, and in forwarding material through the post and by e-mail in answer to 
my numerous e-mailed requests. I am also grateful to the staff of the Liddell Hart 
Centre for Military Archives, London, for facilitating my visit to that institution. 
Whilst writing this thesis, Lieutenant Colonel Terry Kinloch and Mr Mike Smith were 
very helpful with their bibliographies and comments, as they were writing on the New 
Zealand Mounted Rifles and Major General Chaytor. I am particularly indebted to 
Terry for loaning me his personal copy of Yeomanry and Mounted Rifles Training and 
for his insights into the New Zealand Mounted Rifles. 
Many thanks go to Doctor Glyn Harper of the Centre for Defence Studies, Massey 
University, who ha.s been my supervisor throughout the two years, who loaned me 
books, videos and articles from his personal collection, and who offered many 
insights and suggestions during our meetings and in e-mail correspondence. 
Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family, who have supported me in this 
endeavour over the past two years. 
Peter Wood 
5 November 2004 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Allied campaign in Egypt, the Sinai and Palestine during World War I remains 
virtually unknown. Even as it was being fought, it was considered a sideshow to the 
Western Front. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the exploits of the New 
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was overshadowed by Gallipoli, Passchendaele and 
the Somme. Even these, with the exception of Gallipoli, have been all but forgotten 
since World War II, where the battles of Crete, El Alamein, and Cassino, and the names, 
Freyberg, Kippenberger and Upham are far more likely to be recalled today. Few New 
Zealanders would associate the names Magdhaba, Ayun Kara or Amman with pitched 
battles, nor the names Chaytor and Meldrum with successful New Zealand formation 
commanders. 
Despite the lack of awareness within contemporary New Zealand, the Sinai Palestine 
campaign is worth examination as it was highly mobile, with manoeuvre on a scale 
seldom seen on the Western Front. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles (NZMR) Brigade, 
re-formed after fighting as dismounted infantry at Gallipoli, comprised the New Zealand 
contribution to the campaign, and it played a key role in bringing the campaign to a 
successful conclusion . 
This study will examine the tactics employed by the NZMR Brigade and its regiments 
during the Sinai Palestine Campaign. It will determine how the Boer War shaped tactical 
doctrine and mounted rifles organisations in New Zealand and Great Britain up until the 
commencement of World War I. The study aims to determine the tactics employed on 
operations by New Zealanders and note any developments as the campaign 
progressed. This provides the three focus questions of this thesis. They are: 
• How·did the Boer War shape tactical doctrine and mounted rifles organisations up 
until the commencement of World War I? 
• What tactics were employed by the NZMR Brigade during the Sinai Palestine 
Campaign? 
• How did NZMR tactics evolve during the course of the campaign? 
The first chapter will examine Boer War operations from 1899 until 1902 in order to 
establish the 'legacy' for both Great Britain and New Zealand in terms of the 'cavalry 
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debate' and the development of mounted rifles organisations and tactics. The second 
chapter will identify basic tactical concepts, before determining doctrine and tactics that 
were in use by New Zealand mounted rifles immediately prior to World War I. The third 
chapter will background the Sinai Palestine campaign, explain the NZMR Brigade 
organisation and introduce the Turkish Army. 
Chapters Four to Six chronologically trace NZMR Brigade operations focusing on 
patrolling and on offensive operations at brigade level and below; the advance, the 
attack and the pursuit. The tactics employed within the NZMR will be determined by 
analysing combat 'actions' between 4 March 1916 and 27 September 1918. Chapters 
detail the initial attacks at Rafa and Magdhaba, the breeching of the Turkish line at 
Beersheba and operations beyond the Jordan River concluding with Chaytor's Force 
capture of the Turkish IV Army. The thesis concludes by examining the influence of 
command and leadership on tactics, the role of Major General Chaytor, and a summary 
of NZMR Brigade tactics as they were at the conclusion of the campaign. 
The study concludes that in the main, the NZMR Brigade employed fire tactics and the 
basic mounted rifles doctrine that was in use shortly before World War I. During the 
campaign , occasional mounted charges were attempted, but not on a scale to be of 
major significance in tactics. The New Zealanders became adept at mounted patrolling , 
developed their capacity for close reconnaissance and improved on the employment of 
machine guns and artillery as the campaign progressed. Longevity in command at 
brigade, regimental and squadron level along with the combat experience of Boer War 
veterans served to perfect a sleek fighting formation , whose final independent operation 
was a dismounted night attack. 
NZMR tactics included many similar features to the Boer War operations of the New 
Zealand contingents. Fighting was mainly dismounted, with lines of soldiers supported 
by artillery and machineguns making their way forward in daylight, under fire, toward 
enemy strong points. A bayonet charge would usually prove to be decisive. Patrolling on 
horseback was extensive, whether as a security element during a combat action or 
between operations. Occasional mounted charges were attempted, although were most 
often unsuccessful due to unanticipated or unsuppressed enemy fire. 
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This study does not intend to determine if a distinctly New Zealand style of fighting 
emerged, nor to compare Naw Zealand tactics with those of their Australian or British 
counterparts. More orten than not, New Zealanders were operating alongside Australian 
and other Allied troops. New Zealand mounted riflemen fought in most of the major 
actions of the campaign. Despite being but one brigade in a huge Allied army, the NZMR 
Brigade established a reputation as a first class fighting formation, just as their forebears 
had managed in the Boer War. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE BOER WAR 
More than 6,500 New Zealanders served in the Boer War 1999- 1902. The Boer War 
was New Zealand's first military deployment. The New Zealanders were amongst 
29,000 colonial troops that went to South Africa to support Great Britain in her fight 
against the Boer South African Republic (Transvaal) and the Boers' ally, the Orange 
Free State. Most New Zealanders who fought in South Africa were mounted riflemen, 
sent to the war in ten contingents . 
The creation of an Imperial General Staff and the publishing of military doctrine 
reflecting many of the tactical lessons learned in the South Africa were major Boer 
War outcomes for Great Britain. Like New Zealand, the British saw the need for the 
magazine loaded rifle, the range and weight of fire they produced, and understood 
the devastating effect they could have on close order formations. The debate over 
the continued utility of cavalry versus mounted rifles was not truly resolved, so Britain 
entered World War I with cavalry and with mounted rifles, which they called 
yeomanry. 
Before examining the Boer War, it is necessary to distinguish between mounted 
infantry, mounted rifles and cavalry. lain G. Spence's article 'To shoot and Ride: 
Mobility and Firepower', defines each: 
'Mounted Infantry' denoted infantry (and usually Regular Army infantry at that) 
which had undergone additional training to allow them to ride into action. 
Once at the front, they would dismount and fight on foot, using traditional 
infantry tactics. 'Mounted Rifles' were essentially regarded as irregular 
cavalry. Equipped with infantry weapons but not trained as line infantry, they 
fought on foot but were not expected to be expert in traditional infantry tactics. 
'Cavalry' were horsemen equipped with the sword or lance who generally 
fought while mounted, using traditional cavalry tactics. 1 
New Zealand's contributions to the Boer War were, by Spence's definition, truly 
mounted rifles. They did not have the traditional infantry training. They fought more 
like irregulars so were well suited to flank duties, reconnaissance and skirmishing. 
1 lain G. Spence,'To Shoot and Ride'· Mobility in Mounted Warfare'in, Dennis, Peter and Grey, Jeffrey 
(Eds), The Boer War Army, Nation and Emplfe, Army History Unit, Department of Defence, Canberra, 
2000, p. 119. 
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Background 
The Boers were horse mounted and well armed.2 Just prior to the war, they had 
purchased thousands of modern rifles from Germany. This enabled the Boers to 
open fire at greater ranges than the British anticipated, and, as their rifles were 
magazine fed, the Boers could achieve a heavy weight of fire. Thus, Boer tactics 
were to open fire at extreme range, with volleys that caused maximum casualties 
amongst close order British infantry, who had further to advance before closing with 
the enemy for close combat. 3 Artillery was the Boers' only professional military arm, 
the mass of their Army was based on irregular commandos, able to be called up by 
their commandants at any time. 4 
Boer commandos numbered from 300 to 3000 burghers, based roughly on electoral 
districts. 5 Being predominantly of farming stock, the Boers had excellent knowledge 
of the land, and were capable shots and horsemen. This provided them with superior 
mobility and firepower, enabling their use of hit and run tactics. From concealed 
positions, they were able to engage British close order formations, breaking contact 
when threatened themselves. British tactics and dismounted infantry were not suited 
to counter Boer tactics, other than as static security elements. The Boers enjoyed a 
huge initial advantage in comparative mobility over the British forces.6 
The Boer War had two distinct phases. The first was a 'conventional' phase where 
Boer formations fought the British in 'set piece' battles. This phase included the Boer 
sieges of Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith, the battle of Spion Kop the Allied 
advance on Kimberley that ended with the capture of the Boer capital, Pretoria. In 
this phase, New Zealanders saw action at Jasfontein and Slingersfontein, and 
trekked and fought their way as part of Plumer's cavalry column to Kimberley, 
Johannesburg and Pretoria. 
2 Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, Sphere Books Limited, 1979, reprinted 1991,p. 41 and 164. 
3 Edwin L. Kennedy, Jnr, MaJ, USA, 'The Australian Light Horse: A Study of the Evolution of Tactical and 
Operational Maneuver' , U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, USA, 1991, 
p. 27 
4 The Boers also built up their artillery, procuring four 155 mm howitzers (Long Toms), fourteen 75 mm 
field guns and four 120 mm howitzers. 
5 D.O.W Hall, The New Zealanders ,n South Afnca, War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 
Wellington, 1949, p. 12. 
6 William L. Taylor, 'The Debate over changing cavalry tactics and weapons', in Military Affairs, Vol 
XXVII I, 1964-1965, p.173. 
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The second phase coincided with an increase in Allied mobility. In this phase, he 
Boers abandoned conventional operations. Instead, they adopted guerrilla tactics, 
with hit and run raids behind British 'lines' . This forced the Allied forces to re-think 
their own tactics, leading to the development of 'flying columns' based on mounted 
troops, and the conduct of 'drives' to sweep Boer commandos onto lines of static 
blockhouses where they could be killed or captured. Boers tended to defend kopjes 
(hills} or drifts (river crossings) for as long as it suited them. They were content to 
snipe and raid and would break contact unless cut off. Neither side undertook set 
piece attacks on the scale of the first phase. Boers were usually 'dislodged by wide 
turning flanking movements with arcs of anything from five to fifteen miles from the 
position being attacked.'7 The New Zealanders participated in flying columns, new 
model 'drives' and in detaining Boer families and cattle as part of anti-guerilla 
operations. 
New Zealand troops participated in both phases, although the majority served in the 
latter. It is not intended to cover the Boer War in detail. However, an explanation of 
some of the operations that the New Zealanders were involved in will be necessary in 
order to determine the tactics that developed and whether these were repeated in 
World War I mounted operations doctrine during combat. 
The New Zealand Experience 
The First Phase 
The actions undertaken by the First Contingent typify New Zealand experience 
during the first phase of the war. The contingent arrived in Cape Town on 23 
November 1899. Within nine days of disembarking in Cape Town , they moved to the 
northern Cape Colony where they joined General John French's cavalry division at 
Naauwpoort. The troops were deployed straight on operations due to recent 
reverses suffered by the British.8 The rushed employment into combat was 
determined, upon reflection after the war, to be a mistake. Future New Zealand 
deployments to World War 1 and later conflicts would include 'in theatre training' and 
acclimatisation before commencing combat operations. 
7 Richard Stowers, Rough Riders at War History of New Zealand's involvement m the Anglo- Boer War 
1899- 1902 and information on all members of the ten New Zealand contingents, published by A. 
Stowers, Hamilton, 2002, p.6. 
8 Christopher Pugsley, The ANZAC Expertence: New Zealand, Australia and the Emp,re m the First 
World War, Reed Publishing (NZ) Ltd, 2004, p. 42. 
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The Contingent's first major action was at Jasfontein Farm on December 1899. The 
New Zealanders advanced' ... on the farm, which was done in extended line, 
dismounted, with bayonets fixed' expecting to fight the Boer occupants, however, the 
Boers had escaped.9 The New Zealanders then occupied the farm buildings 
themselves. Under the cover of artillery and rifle covering fire, the Boers attempted to 
outflank the New Zealanders in order to re-capture the farm. Some New Zealanders 
had to occupy a nearby kopje that overlooked both the farm and the flank route that 
the Boers were using, in order to prevent the Boers from occupying it themselves and 
making the farm position untenable. Lessons were learned from this action about 
enemy and flanking manoeuvre, the need to cut Boers off to prevent them escaping 
and about maintaining watch over one's own flanks . The cavalry division then moved 
to Slingersfontein where a base was established from which to patrol the local area. 
The significance of high ground was further reinforced on 13 January 1900 at 
Slingersfontein Farm. Near the division's base there was a large kopje. It was not 
occupied, nor were outposts established on it. When it was determined that the 
Boers intended to occupy this feature and thus dominate the base, the New 
Zealanders were rushed to it, reaching the summit just ahead of the Boers. 
Thereafter a picket was maintained on the hill , despite periodic sniping. Two days 
later, the position came under intense fire signalling a major Boer attack. The New 
Zealanders and troops from the Yorkshire Regiment withstood heavy enemy fire, 
sustained significant casualties, but prevented the kopje being captured. The New 
Zealanders defeated the Boer attack with a spirited bayonet charge. The kopje 
became known as New Zealand Hill. The battle established the New Zealand 
reputation, just two months after arriving in theatre.10 Later the division moved to 
Orange River Station ready to participate in the relief of Kimberley. 
With the arrival of more troops in South Africa, General French was tasked to relieve 
Kimberley. The plan to relieve Kimberley required mounted troops because of the 
distances involved and the speed required. Lord Kitchener made it clear to General 
French that the column must out flank and bypass the Boers, not take them head on. 
9 Richard Stowers, Kiwi Versus Boer, The First New Zealand Mounted Rifles m the Anglo- Boer War 
1899- 1902, Print House, Cambridge, 1992, p.29. At this point the New Zealanders were not 
experienced enough to have cut offs in place prior to the attack that would prevent the Boer escaping or 
to position troops on higher ground to overwatch and cover their dismounted advance to the farm. This 
would change as they gained combat experience. 
10 Ibid, p. 46. General French's address to the New Zealander's following the battle included the words 
'it gives me great pleasure to congratulate you on a very spirited and gallant manner in which you 
resisted a very clever and daring attack on the part of the enemy. It 1s not the first time nor the second 
time that you have been under heavy rifle fire when you have conducted yourself well.' 
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In order to achieve this, the regular (dismounted) infantry was left behind.11 The 
column was issued three days rations to make them self-sufficient and all non-
essential equipment was withdrawn in preparation for the twenty five mile "dash" to 
Kimberley. The trekking was arduous: 
During six days continuous march, we had only 20 hours sleep at night in all. 
On Sunday 11 1\ we marched and fought for 21 hours and on Tuesday and 
Wednesday we marched continuously for 23 hours without water, and fought 
again on Thursday morning, after which we marched 25 miles to Kimberley, 
all this under a blazing sun ... 12 
These long treks established the pattern for mounted operations. Night rides became 
accepted practice. These required good scouting and guiding skills, which the New 
Zealanders excelled in, despite their lack of formal cavalry training. Night movement 
avoided the heat of the day, minimised Boer observation and assisted in achieving 
the element of surprise 
Following the relief of Kimberley the New Zealanders were attached to the South 
Welsh Borderers to instruct the Borderers in riding and scouting skills.13 The South 
Welsh Borderers were one of the British infantry regiments already in theatre that 
were hastily mounted as a means of achieving comparable mobility to the Boers, until 
such time as sufficient mounted troops could be brought out from England. The 
pattern of attaching contingents to different columns meant the New Zealanders were 
never under unified command, 'but although they regretted its necessity they pointed 
out that it was the New Zealanders' skill in reconnoitring untraversed country which 
caused them to be so much in demand.'14 
The first phase ended with the capture of Pretoria, capital of the Transvaal on 5 June 
1900. Although many thought the war was almost over, Boer leaders Christian De 
Wet, Louis Botha and Koos De La Rey conducted a guerrilla campaign that lasted 
until 1902. 
11 Pakenham, p. 313. 
12 Stowers, R., Kiwi versus Boer, p. 62. The final 25 mile 'march' was the mounted dash into Kimberley. 
New Zealanders are credited with being the first Allied troops to enter Kimberley. Note that the word 
march actually means 'ride', the effect on the horses was equally felt. 
13 Ibid, p. 67 
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The Second Phase 
Further New Zealand Contingents arrived as the preceding contingent's tour was 
about to expire and the New Zealand commitment was extended. The remainder of 
this section illustrates typical New Zealand experience in the conduct of anti-guerilla 
operations. 
In order to conduct anti- guerrilla operations, the Allies formed Flying Columns based 
on mounted troops. The columns had comparative mobility with the Boers although 
typically took too much baggage and were overly heavily reliant on slow ox carts for 
the carriage of horse fodder and supplies. The Kimberley Flying Column was typical. 
It comprised: Two Fifteen pounder guns and two Porn Pomguns from the Royal 
Artillery 15 , mounted Squadrons from 50th Imperial Yeomanry, Somerset Light 
Infantry, Scottish Rifles , Dennison Scouts (of the South African Rifles) , a squadron of 
the British South African Police and C Squadron of the Fifth New Zealand Mounted 
Rifles . Frank Perham describes the Kimberley Flying Column: 
The Column was a very mobile one and for the sake of speed always 
travelled with as little to hamper (it) as possible. It operated mainly in the 
Orange Free State ... . Its main duties were convoy work and dealing with Boer 
guerrilla tactics, which it did quickly and effectively. 16 
Various tactics were developed by the columns to locate the Boers, often by making 
themselves targets: 
April 15th . The Column was on the move at 4 a.m. My section was instructed 
to occupy a post on the flank until the column passed. At 8 a.m. we camped 
near two farms for breakfast. Afterwards, the Dennisons with one Porn Porn 
and the New Zealanders with the other were sent out patrolling in different 
directions looking for trouble. 17 
14 Hall , p. 26. This was in response to Lt Col Alfred Robin, Commanding the 1st Contingent , on 
complaining about the 'continued dispersal of the New Zealanders' 
15 The 'Porn Porn' was the nickname given to the Maxim automatic gun which fired belt-fed 37mm high 
explosive shells . The nickname was derived from the sound the shells made as they hit their target. The 
Porn Porn gun Is the forerunner of today's 40mm automatic grenade launchers. Melvin M. Johnson and 
Charles T Haven, Automatic Arms Their History and Development, William Morrow and Co., New York, 
1941 . 
16 Trooper Frank Perham, The Kimberley Flying Column, Bemg Reminiscences of Service m the South 
African war of 1899- 1903 (sic), Print House, Cambridge, New Zealand, 1992, p. 41 
17 Ibid, p. 68. 
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An account of how they did this appears in Hall: 
The main body of New Zealanders trailed a coat before the Boers' position 
and successfully induced them to open fire and disclose their positions to the 
British artillery. When at nightfall the Boers fell back, the advancing New 
Zealanders captured one of the Maxims.18 
The Allies learnt that guard forces needed to be employed in order to protect the 
main body and to locate, or be located by, the Boers at sufficient range that the main 
body could still manoeuvre. Joseph Linklater explains the forces required to prevent 
major interference from the Boers when his squadron of New Zealand's Sixth 
Contingent were providing advance and flank guards for General Plumer's column: 
When going through hostile country scouts always go first, then follows in 
extended order- that is, fifty to one hundred yards between files- the advance 
guard .... the supports to the advance, called flankers, follow on, on the 
extreme right and left of the advance. The big guns come next, protected 
either side by a strong escort, and then the main body of troops. 19 
This did not prevent Boers sniping at the columns and flanks by day and then 
harassing, even attacking, camps at night. Boers would occupy kopjes along 
anticipated Allied routes, from where they would snipe and delay the columns then 
disappear. Allied counter tactics were to fire the Porn Porn gun at the sniper post, 
however, the Boer would often retire from the kopje under fire, re-locate, then harass 
another portion of the column.20 Sometimes the Boers would not fire from the kopje 
at long range, but would wait until the scouts had bunched up below ready to scale it 
dismounted and only then would the commandos unleash a fusillade. In one case, 
the Boers waited for the single breathless scout to reach the top before firing at him 
at point blank range.21 
18 Hall, p. 30. The Maxim was a Boer machine gun and thus a significant capture. Presumably the coat 
was dragged to create dust and therefore suggest a worthwhile target. It would take courage to 
~urposely induce the enemy to fire on one in that fashion. 
9 Joseph Linklater, On active Service with the Silent Sixth, McKee and Co., date of publication not 
specif ied, p. 18. 
20 Perham, p. 46. 
21 Ibid, pp. 64-65. In this case, the New Zealanders were advance scouts for the column. On reaching 
the base of a steep kopJe, Trooper Philpott dismounted and climbed to the top. On reaching the top he 
was fired upon at point blank range. Although he managed to get back down to his horse, he died of his 
wounds two hours later. Philpott was buried, wrapped 1n his own blanket, near where he had been shot. 
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Experience taught the Allies to adapt to Boer tactics. They would send out parties 
before dawn to occupy kopjes and drifts along the intended route of a column or 
convoy in order to minimise Boer interference. They learned to draw Boer fire and 
thus make the Boer a target for the Porn Porn guns, or once they had identified the 
Boer position, would attempt to outflank it. Both these tactics would cause the Boer to 
withdraw. On one occasion the Boers withdrew under the cover of smoke they had 
produced by setting fire to long grass. 
Everything had to be picketed, escorted, protected. Mounted troops were detailed to 
escort guns and supply columns. Outposts were established at night to protect 
bases, or during night halts of a larger group. Usually an outpost would consist of five 
troopers and a Non Commissioned Officer. A main picket would be positioned nearer 
the base camp than the outposts. Being stronger, the main picket's duty was ' .. . to 
come to the aid of the outpost if we were attacked .. .'22 
Boers proved to be elusive. Knowing , or at least suspecting, that the Boers stayed on 
farms where they could hide away and be fed, new tactics were developed to catch 
them. As Linklater explains: 
Reveille 1 a.m; moved 3 a.m; camped at 7 a.m. This early morning marching 
was meant to surprise the Boers who were supposed to be lurking in 
farmhouses. 23 
In surrounding any farmhouse our plan of action was as follows- a company 
of men, keeping in touch with each other would surround the house in 
extended order, thus forming a large circle around it. Each man would march 
towards the house, keeping as much hidden as possible, until the house was 
reached, when the surrender of it inmates was demanded.24 
Once the occupants came out, the house would be searched thoroughly. Often cattle 
would be confiscated. 
Kitchener had lines of blockhouses constructed and introduced the tactic of 'new 
model drives' ; large sweeps across the veldt, forcing Boer commandos and their 
cattle against blockhouse lines where they would (in theory) be killed or captured. 
22 Linklater, p. 31 . 
23 Ibid, p. 51 . 
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Boer counter-tactics included splitting their forces up and manoeuvring to the flanks 
of the sweeping forces hoping to locate a gap. Another Boer tactic was to conduct a 
mass break out. Break outs were occasionally achieved at night by forcing cattle 
through first, with the commandos following immediately behind the cattle, exploiting 
the confusion and the cover provided by the animals. Drives were not always 
effective as this example points out: 
On the night of 5 February (1902), these four super-columns, about nine 
thousand strong, roughly one man for every ten yards, lined out across the 
fifty four miles of the open end of the rectangle . Meanwhile, other columns 
were sent to reinforce the blockhouses on the other three sides, and seven 
armoured trains, equipped with guns and search lights, steamed up and down 
the railway tracks ... .. By dawn on 8 February, only 285 out of 2,000 odd Boers 
had been accounted for.25 
In reality it was impossible to maintain a totally intact line. The Boers could always 
select a point at which to break out if they could not exploit a gap in a flank or 
infiltrate through a gap quietly by night. For the Allies, the need to have a continuous 
blockhouse line used up all available troops so there were never sufficient mobile 
reserves to act as reinforcements and blocking forces once the Boer break out point 
had been identified . Inevitably the Boers had local superiority at the point they chose 
to break out. This was the case at Langverwacht where the Boers broke through the 
cordon that members of the New Zealand Seventh Contingent were covering. Six 
hundred Boers escaped through the breech leaving 24 New Zealanders killed and a 
further 41 wounded.26This was a high casualty rate for the eighty New Zealanders 
defending that point of the line. 27It highlights the effect of mass, 600:80 or 7.5: 1 that 
the Boers achieved at their breakout point. 
Despite some local successes, Boer resistance finally collapsed. As part of the anti-
guerrilla operations, many Boer farms had been burned. Over 120,000 Boer women 
and children were placed in concentration camps, thousands died in captivity. 28 On 
31 May 1902 the Boers accepted British sovereignty under the Treaty of Vereeniging. 
24 Ibid, p. 67 
25 Pakenham, p. 545- 546. Clearly, these drives were not always effective given the resources 
employed, with only 1 0% of the Boers being captured 1n the example quoted. 
26 Hall, pp. 68-69. Fourteen Boers were killed and 20 wounded by the New Zealanders. 
27 Stowers, Rough Riders at War, p. 9 and pp. 23- 24. The Boer night break out at Langverwacht caused 
the eighty Seventh Contingent defenders a total of 65 casualties. 
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More than 6,500 New Zealanders served during the war. Fifty eight New Zealand 
soldiers were killed in action, 11 died of wounds received and 27 seven were 
accidentally killed. One hundred and thirty six died of disease while 190 
approximately were wounded.29 
Effects in Great Britain 
The war resulted in a number of reforms within the British Army. Two key ones were 
the establishment of an Imperial General Staff and the publication of army doctrine. 
Mixed lessons were learned by Great Britain from cavalry and mounted infantry 
experience in the Boer War. Whilst the mobility provided by the horse was generally 
accepted, there was widespread debate, especially within military circles, over the 
continued utility of cavalry and whether mounted infantry or yeomanry could achieve 
the same tactical tasks as cavalry. Cavalry advocates believed, for instance, that 
colonial cavalry would not be suited to the battlefields of Europe30 , and that 'the Boer 
War was only a colonial struggle which had little bearing on the type of conflict to be 
expected among the major powers.'31 
The Times was scathing over the utility of the cavalry troops, citing cavalry training 
and mentality as limiting their ability to compete with the Boers. It argued that cavalry 
manoeuvres in massed formation, based on shock action with the sword or lance, 
were extremely vulnerable to an enemy armed with long range magazine fed rifles 
operating from cover, seldom visible to the cavalry. Traditional cavalry training (and 
experience) called for fighting in close formations, usually against mounted or 
dismounted opponents, in the open. While cavalry units converted to the rifle on 
Kitchener's insistence, many viewed the Boer War as a 'one off' experience and thus 
argued that no lessons should be drawn from it that would detract from cavalry's 
continued utility, completely overlooking recent American Civil War experience.32 
However, the tactics employed by the mounted rifles and yeomanry forces were 
enshrined in doctrine that was produced for British yeomanry and colonial mounted 
28 Hall, p.3. Hall states that 20,000 Boer women and children died in (British) concentration camps. 
29 Stowers, Rough Riders at War, p. 43. 
30 Charles Sydney Goldmann , With General French and the Cavalry m South Afnca, MacMillan and Co, 
Limited, 1903, p.416 and Jean Bou, p. 103. 
3 1 Taylor, William, L., p. 174. 
32 Bou, Jean, 'Modern Cavalry: Mounted Rifles, the Boer War, and the Doctrinal Debates', in Dennis and 
Grey, p.100. Bou notes that the cavalry arm of both the Union and Confederate armies preferred 
firearms to blade type weapons, usually dismounted in order to use their carbines but if they remained 
mounted, their weapon of choice was the revolver. See also Taylor, p. 174. 
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rifles. Patrolling, fire tactics and the care of horses were all included in the doctrine 
intended for Territorial and colonial mounted infantry. Cavalry tactics, most notably 
the mounted charge, were excluded from this doctrine although remained within the 
handbooks written for British cavalry. 
Effects in New Zealand 
New Zealanders soldiered alongside the best from Australia, Canada and Great 
Britain, and proved they were more than equal to the task. This success, coupled 
with minimal casualties sustained, meant there would be a rush of volunteers for 
future deployments and ensured that New Zealand retained mounted troops within its 
armed forces, for home defence and for future force contributions. Thus New 
Zealand was in a position to immediately contribute a mounted rifles brigade in World 
War I. 
The Boer War produced a group of experienced mounted riflemen. 'New Zealanders 
experienced the advantages of using mobility to outmanoeuvre an enemy whilst 
maintaining a fighting ethos.'33 Some veterans maintained their association with the 
armed forces by joining the Volunteers or serving with the Permanent Force. The 
experience of Ex- Private Frank Perham (Fifth Contingent) was typical. After 
returning to civilian life he still yearned to be involved with the military. To achieve 
this, he joined the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry.34 
Military events found their way into agricultural shows, where they provided a 
spectacle, re-lived the Boer War experience and provided some training value for 
Volunteer units. 
The end of the [Boer] war and the return of troops served to keep alive the 
military spirit in the many volunteer units which had been formed throughout 
the country and the members trained assiduously in military drill and rifle 
shooting etc .. . no agricultural show or pastoral show was complete without its 
program of military events ... 35 
33 Mark Wheeler, 'Evaluating the Role of Mounted Infantry During the 1899- 1902 Anglo- Boer War 1n 
order to establish observations applicable to the New Zealand Mounted Infantry of the Future', Massey 
University Thesis, 4 December 2000, p. 47 
34 Perham, p. 85. 
35 1997.503 Memoirs of Corporal McMillan (' Forty Thousand Horsemen)', Kippenberger Military Archive 
and Research Library (Army Museum, Wa1ouru) , p. 5. 
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The Boer War highlighted serious issues in the administration and welfare of the 
men. By sending small contingents entirely of mounted troops, with no dedicated 
administrative staffs, the New Zealanders and Australians were significantly worse off 
that their British or Canadian counterparts. Future New Zealand deployments would 
ensure dedicated personnel deployed as part of the contingent to take care of pay, 
mail, medical and spiritual needs, to receive, hold and train reinforcements and to 
ensure the men had access to hot food and reasonable accommodation.36 
Horses 
More than eight thousand were sent to South Africa, only one returned to New 
Zealand.37 All contingents, except the Seventh, took horses with them aboard their 
troopships. Despite the New Zealanders care for their horses, conditions were harsh, 
for man and horse, resulting in casualties to both from more than enemy action. The 
hours were long, fodder was often scarce. If a horse died or became lame, the horse-
less trooper was consigned to an ox cart, or forced to walk, until a re-mount could be 
obtained. Lame or sick horses would be shot. The general shortage of horses in 
South Africa was a limiting factor on Allied mobility. Boer ponies were popular 
remounts, although not easily obtained . New Zealand horses were preferred, 
contingents usually passed them on to the other New Zealand contingents as they 
departed for home. 
Many horses died in South Africa38 . ' ... the mortality of horses during the campaign 
was high: those which were not well looked after by their riders died first.' It is 
estimated that 400, 346 horses, mules and donkeys were 'expended' in the course of 
the war. As the horse was a bigger target than the rider, and also sometimes used for 
cover from enemy fire, it was only natural that horses should have a greater chance 
of being hit by enemy action the rider. As well as enemy action and lack of adequate 
care by their riders, horses were also lost to disease and even due to unsupervised 
grazing. It is said that at times the route taken by the Allies on a long trek could be 
determined by following the lines of dead horses: 
36 Pugsley, ANZAC Expenence,. pp. 45-46. By contrast, when the British and Canadians came in from a 
trek they had access to hot food, tent lines that were already established, mail was waiting, and they 
could draw their pay. This 1s well covered by Chris Pugsley, and while not directly related to tactics, the 
issue of administration and command responsibility for the welfare of soldiers by the,r officers 1s closely 
linked to morale, and therefore to combat effectiveness. 
37 Stowers, Rough Riders at War, p. 29. The horse's name was 'Major', the mount of Major Robin, 
commander of the First Contingent. 
38 Stowers, Rough Riders at War, p. 29. 
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Between Bloemfontein and Kimberley it was something awful, the route was a 
scene of desolation, strewn with dead horses and oxen, with crowds of South 
African vultures flying overhead them, and starving horses left by the British 
grazing on the scanty grass.39 
Conclusions 
The two main effects of the Boer War were the continuation of mounted rifles units 
within New Zealand's defence force and the production of doctrine by the British, for 
armed forces generally, but mounted rifles and yeomanry units specifically. The 
debate over the utility of cavalry was to some extent a sideshow. Certainly, the 
firepower of the rifle was acknowledged, although its full destructive potential in 
conjunction with the machine gun was not fully appreciated until World War I. 
Additional benefits were an understanding by New Zealanders of the need to 
conserve horses and for the proper administration and welfare of deployed 
contingents. Boer War veterans provided an invaluable experience base from which 
future contingents could be trained and led. 
39 Spence, p. 122. 
